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PRIVATE SECTOR ISSUES IN A PUBLIC SECTOR
RETRO-LUTION: THE SUPREME COURT'S
BUSINESS-RELATED DECISIONS IN THE

OCTOBER 1999 TERM
Barbara K. Bucholtz*
INTRODUCTION

As is the case with other issues before the Supreme Court this term,
business-related issues stand in the shadow of an overarching concern about the
Court's revisionist federalism. While many of the contours of the Rehnquist
Federalism are somewhat opaque,' what is now abundantly clear is that the
dominant feature of the Retmquistian legacy will be a federalism jurisprudence
premised on pre-Constitutional, anti-federalist sensibilities - hence a "retro2
lution.

'

,

* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. In sum, resolution of the business-related preemption cases this term settles relatively little and
serves as harbinger for a spate of future legal disputes.
2. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federalism's"Old Deal": What's Right and Wrong with Conservative
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REv. 201 (2000), explaining that the developments of Rehnquistian
Federalism began in (then) Justice Rehnquist's first two terms when his opinions in three cases
signaled strong states' rights proclivities: Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); and Slater Land Co., v. Tulane Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719 (1973). Id. at 204. Professor Shane goes on to identify National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) as
Rehnquist's most important opinion in that period of his tenure of the Court and Professor Shane
notes that the Usery decision not only rolled back settled law on state sovereignty but also rested on
uncertain authority. Professor Shane first explains the holding:
[In Usery] Justice Rehnquist announced that states could henceforth not be subjected even
to Commerce Clause legislation that would be valid if applied to private parties, if such
legislation: (1) purposed to regulate the 'States qua States'; (2) would 'displace the states'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions'; and
(3) was not justified by an exceptionally strong federal interest that overbalanced the States'
interest in autonomy.
Id. at 204-205 (citations omitted).
Professor Shane, then, analyzes the holding:
Justice Rehnquist's opinion was elusive on the source of this principle; although he
mentioned the Tenth Amendment, he hardly discussed it. He seemed instead to rest on a
background understanding of state sovereignty from late Eighteenth Century political
thought, a version of state sovereignty that could not be impaired by federal legislation.
Unfortunately for his thesis, the late Eighteenth Century political thought most consistent
with Rehnquist's view of state sovereignty belonged to the Anti-Federalist's, for whom the
Constitution was a significant political defeat precisely because it did not embody their
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And, in those cases where business-related issues implicated federalism
concerns, the Court often opted to pull the case within the orbit of its evolving
doctrines.3 In other respects, the Supreme Court decisions that impacted the
business community in the October 1999 term were consistent with the Court's
posture in previous terms: pragmatic, moderately pro-business4 and inclined to
apply traditional rules of statutory construction, rather than theoretical constructs5
to resolution of the issues. On balance, it was a term characterized by clarification
and fine-tuning of existing doctrine either by building on recent precedent 6 or by
resolving Circuit Court disputes.7

political philosophy.
Id at 205 (citations omitted).
But see, Steven G. Calebresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of
United States v. Lopez, 94 MIcH L. REv. 752 (1995) applauding the body of Supreme Court cases that
have explicated Relinquistian Federalism since Usery. As of the date of that article, 1995, those cases
included, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (provision in Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act violated Tenth Amendment by exceeding Article I powers); and United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun - Free School Zones Act exceeded Congressional Commerce
Clause power) Judge Calabresi praised the Lopez decisions as a "shattering" "the notion that, after
fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the days of limited national
power." Id. at 752. In a subsequent article, Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Counter
MajoritarianDifficulty, 66 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1373, 1379-80 (1998) Calabresi celebrated the addition
of new case law to the evolving jurisprudence and located its doctrinal roots, not in Anti-Federalist
precepts but in pre-1937 case law:
Commenting on the post-Lopez cases of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious
Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congressional authority under Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment.); Seminole Tribe v. Florida 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress couldn't abrogate
states' 11th Amendment immunity to being sued in federal court in the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act.) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (provision in Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act exceeds reach of Article I and is inconsistent with
separation of powers and federalism precepts), Judge Calabresi opined, "[T]he U.S.
Supreme Court is again policing textually-provided for structural jurisdictional lines in a way
that has not occurred in this country since before 1937." Id., quoted in, Stevens, supra note 1
n.38.
Professor Shane concurs that Rehnquistian Federalism harkens back to pre-1937, concepts, calling this
rebirth an "Old Deal" but he views it as somewhat less salubrious and beneficent:
Since Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(overturning Usery), the Court has launched into a three-pronged attack on congressional
regulatory power that goes well beyond the scope of Usery and suggests at least a potential
return to what I would call the 'Old Deal' with regard to the Court's treatment of federalism.
Under the Old Deal, the Court prior to 1937 had shown itself willing in the name of
federalism to second-guess the justifiability of national legislation and to impose categorical
limits on Congress' capacity to control interstate commerce.
Either way, the Rehnquistian Federalism amounts to a doctrinal Retro-lution, the reach and
ramifications of which are still unclear.
3. See infra notes 235-252 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 59-73 and accompanying
text.
4. See generally, Barbara K. Bucholtz, Taking Care of Business: A Review of Busness-Related
Cases in the 1995-1996 Supreme Court Term., 32 TULSA L. J. 449 (1997).
5. See generally, Barbara K. Bucholtz, Sticking to Business: A Review of Business-Related Cases
in the 1997-1998 Supreme Court Term, 34 TULSA L. J. 207 (1999).
6. See, e.g., infra notes 8-33 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., infra notes 135-143 and accompanying text. See also, Appendices A & B following this
article.
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The business community, especially in the "Oil Patch," had much to
celebrate with the signal decision this term involving the private sector's
contractual dealings with the federal government. In Mobil Oil Exploration &
Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United States,8 the Court ordered the federal
government to pay Mobil Oil Exploration and Marathon Oil 9 restitution of $156
million for breaching its commitment to the oil companies under certain lease
contracts. That breach, said the Court, substantially impaired the value of the
contracts to the companies. Here is a clear example of the evolution and
clarification of doctrine: the Court building on its recent precedent. In this
instance, the precedent was United States v. Winstar Corp.'0 Mobil builds on
Winstar in several respects. First, it reinforces and expands the concept of treating
the federal government as party to a contract like any other contracting party: by
applying settled contract rules to the facts of the case." Second, it reinforces
Winstar's holding that, in the absence of express contractual language to the
contrary, 12where the federal government contracts with a private party, the federal
government bears the risk of legislative changes that significantly impair the
bargained-for benefit to the private party.'3 And, finally, Mobil reinforces the
doctrinal stability of those propositions by garnering an 8-1 majority, in
4
contradistinction to Winstar's mere plurality.1
Recall that Winstar concerned three financial institutions that contracted
with the federal government to participate in "supervisory mergers" with failing
thrift institutions during the savings & loan crisis of the 1980's.15 Under these
contractual arrangements, certain healthy institutions agreed to become burdened
with the assumption of failed thrifts' liabilities and, in exchange, the federal
government, under the auspices of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), agreed to grant the healthy thrifts beneficial accounting
treatment in the form of "supervisory good will" which the healthy institutions
could count toward their reserve requirements and amortize over a maximum 40
year period. 16 That inducement to acquire failed thrifts, "supervisory goodwill,"
was eliminated by subsequent legislation: the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) which, inter alia, imposed
uniform capital standards on all thrifts. This standard includes a minimum core
capital of "3 percent of the savings association's total assets.'
Further, they

8. Mobile Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc., v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2423 (2000).
9. Marathon's case, No. 99-253, was consolidated with Mobil's case.
10. Unites States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (plurality opinion).
11. Mobil Oil, 120 S.Ct. 2423. Cf Winstar, 518 U.S. 839.

12- See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2452-53. Cf Mobil, 120 S. Ct. 2423.
13. See Winstar, 116 S.Ct. at 2452. Cf.Mobil, 120 S. Ct. 2423.
14. Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2440. (However, a seven member majority agreed the federal government

was liable for damages under the same rules that a private breaching party would be).
15. Id. at 2442.
16. See id. at 2443-44 (internal footnotes omitted).
17. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, section 1464 (t)(2)(A).
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defined "core capital" to exclude goodwill.'8
The financial institutions that lost their "supervisory goodwill" under these
provisions of FIRREA 9 argued the provisions barred the government from
meeting its obligations under the contracts; therefore, the government was liable
in damages for breach of contract. The Winstar plurality agreed. 20 In so doing, it
rejected the government's attempt to cast the case as implicating the sovereign
acts doctrine,2 1 finding that where, as in the legislative history of FIRREA, it is
apparent that a substantial legislative purpose was to release the government from
its obligations under the supervisory mergers," the sovereign acts defense is not
available. Applying general principles of contract law, Justice Souter concluded
that the government bargained with respect to the risk allocation and bore the
burden of liability for breach.23
Similarly, in Mobil, the private contracting parties paid the federal
government roughly $158 million in exchange for 10-year renewable lease
contracts which permitted exploration for and development of oil off the coast of
North Carolina subject to compliance with a variety of environmentally friendly
laws and regulations. These laws required the approval of the state in any
Exploration Plan, but permitted a federal override of any state refusal to
acquiesce. 24 During the compliance process, but before the Exploration Plan was
submitted to North Carolina, the Outer Banks Protection Act (OBPA) became
effective. Among other provisions, it prohibited the federal government from
approving any Exploration Plan until certain new OBPA procedures had been
followed. Thus, when North Carolina refused to acquiesce in the companies'
Exploration Plans, the Secretary of Commerce, citing the OBPA, refused to
override.2 The companies sued, alleging breach of contract and the Supreme
Court, in a resounding 8-1 decision agreed.
First, it reaffirmed basic principles relied upon in Winstar, "When the United
States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed
26
generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.
Specifically, the Court applied the following traditional common law rules: 1)

18. See id. at 1464(t)(9)(A). (There was, however, a "transition rule" at §1464(t)(3)(A) which
partially recognized supervisory goodwill for a 6-year period).
19. See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2446.
20. Id. at 2440.
21. See generally, Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925) (explaining the doctrine in the
following manner: "[T]he United States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an
obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a
sovereign"). Justice Souter explained the doctrine this way in Winstar."Hence, governmental action
will not be held against the government... so long as the action's impact upon public contracts is, as in
Horowitz, merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective." Winstar,
116 S. Ct. at 2466.
22 See Winstar, 116 S. Ct. at 2467-69.
23. See id. at 2471.
24. See Mobile Oil Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc., v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2423

(200).
25. See id. at 2431.
26. Id. at 2428 (quoting Winstar,116 S. Ct. 2432).
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"when one party to a contract repudiates that contract, the other party 'is entitled
to restitution for any benefit conferred on' the repudiating party 'by way of part
performance or reliance; ' '27 2) "Repudiation is a 'statement by the obligor to the
obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give
the obligee a claim for damages for total breach;.' 28 and 3) "'total breach' is a
breach that 'so substantially impairs the value of the contract to the injured
party... to allow him to recover damages...., 2 9 Paraphrasing the Court's
application of these contract principles to the case, the Court found that when the
federal government said it would break a contractual promise to the oil companies
that would have the effect of substantially impairing the value of the contract to
them, then - because they did not waive a right to restitution - the oil companies
are entitled to it.30
Following Winstar and Mobil Oil, there is no doubt that common law
contract precepts will dominate the analysis of future government contracts with
private parties. Three caveats, however, are in order. First, the Court was quick
to emphasize that the federal government, like any private contracting party, is
free to bargain for a shift of risk. Therefore, private parties can anticipate the
development of stock provisions in government contracts, which limit the
government's exposure to the restitution liability it faced in Mobil Oil.3 1 Second,
it would be a mistake to assume that contract law will apply across-the-board and
in all respects. Recall, for example, that the government is not compelled to pay
interest on a damage award. 2 And, finally notice how critical the restitution
award is in Mobil Oil, and in similar cases where actual damages may not be
available. In Mobil Oil, for example, the oil companies would have had a
significant evidentiary problem in proving actual damages because they could not
show that but for the government's breach they would have been permitted to
drill. 33 Proving that the government breach was material, thus entitling the private
party to restitution, will become the critical linchpin in similar cases.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Three environmental cases graced the Court's docket this term, presenting
interesting, if not momentous, developments of doctrine that had been framed in
prior cases.3

27. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1979)).
28. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250 (1979)).
29. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243 (1979)).
30. Mobil Oil, 120 S. Ct. at 2423.
31. See, e.g., Harvey Berkman, Government Liability Upheld,NAT'L L.J., July 10, 2000, at B1,col. 1
(citing Professor Joshua I. Schwartz for the insightful comparison with government procurement
contracts, "Procurement contracts are down to a science, containing standard clauses that embody the
collective wisdom of all mistakes made in the past century") (internal citations omitted).
32 See id.
33. See Berkman, supra note 31 (citing E. Edward Bruce at B4 col. 3).
34. Arguably, there were four cases dealing with regulation of conduct in an attempt to protect the
environment. The fourth case, United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000), is analyzed as a
preemption case. See infra notes 279-96 and accompanying text.
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In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.,
the Court further delineated its views on the threshold issues of standing and
mootness. Two terms ago, the Court declared in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environment 36 that a citizen suit provision does not confer standing on a private
citizen to litigate violations of an environmental statute when those violations are
entirely past violations and there is no evidence that they are either continuing at
the commencement of the lawsuit or could continue in the future if not
forestalled. The Fourth Circuit attempted to extend that holding in Friends of
the Earth. The Circuit ruled that even if the private litigants had standing at the
commencement of the action, they lost standing when the case became moot.
Mootness occurred after the defendant reached a settlement with the state agency
which had charged the defendant with violating the terms of its discharge permit
(a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System [NPDES] permit). The
Supreme Court found that the Fourth Circuit had misconstrued the Supreme
Court's holding in Steel Co. and had mistakenly "conflated" its initial standing
analysis in Steel Co. with post-commencement mootness issues also discussed in
3
Steel Co. and other cases.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg explained that while both
threshold issues are rooted in Article III, Section 2 case-or-controversy
39
considerations, standing analysis differs significantly from mootness analysis.
First, the Court considered the standing issue. In 1992, environmental groups
sued Laidlaw Environmental Services for repeatedly exceeding the limits of its
discharge permit (NPDES permit) under the provisions of the Clean Water Act
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act).40 Laidlaw's water waste treatment plant
discharged several pollutants, including mercury. 41 After the environmental
citizens groups notified Laidlaw of their intent to sue, 42 Laidlaw asked the state
agency to preclude the citizen suit by filing suit first. The state agency obliged,
Laidlaw's lawyer drafted the requisite filing documents on behalf of the agency,
the agency commenced suit and, shortly thereafter, reached an out-of-court
settlement with Laidlaw. 43 The environmental groups brought suit, following
expiration of the statutory notification period. The District Court held that the
groups had standing to sue; that the state agency settlement in the prior litigation
did not preclude the action; and that Laidlaw, in fact, had continued to exceed its
permit pollution discharge limitations during the pendency of both actions and
35

35. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
36. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83 (1998).

37. Id.
38. See Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 699 (citing as an example of its post-commencement
mootness analysis, City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 285 (1982)).
39. See id. at 703.
40. 86 Stat. 816, as amended 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. Section 402 of the Act covers the issuance of
an NPDES permit; § 505 of the Act is the citizen suit provision.
41. See Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 700.
42. As was required by Section 505(a) of the Act.
43. See Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. 693.
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had profited thereby in an amount exceeding one million dollars. 44 Nevertheless,
the District Court found that a civil penalty of less than half that amount was
adequate in light of Laidlaw's concomitant obligation to pay the environmental
groups' costs and attorney fees. 45 The Fourth Circuit vacated that decision and
remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on the grounds identified above
that, pursuant to Steel Co.: Laidlaw's compliance with the law after suit was filed
mooted the claims.46 The Circuit also opined that the case was moot because the
environmental groups lost the right to a redressable injury and, thus, lost standing
by virtue of the fact that "the only remedy available.., civil penalties payable to
the government.., would not redress... [any injuries of the environmental
groups]." 47 The Circuit added that the groups had failed to obtain relief on the
merits of the claim and, thus, were not prevailing parties for purposes of recouping
litigation expenses.48 The Supreme Court rejected the Circuit's analysis finding:
that the environmental groups had satisfied Article III's standing requirements as
delineated under the Lujan4 9 3-pronged test for ascertaining injury-in-fact to the
plaintiffs.5 0 The test requires an injury 1) that is concrete and specific; as well as,
actual or imminent; 2) "fairly traceable" to defendant's conduct; 3)and likely to be
redressed by a favorable ruling.5 ' Second, it made clear the citizen groups had
standing to seek civil penalties on behalf of the government. And in that regard,
the Court alluded to Congressional findings that civil penalties deter future
violations.52 Third , it rejected the dissent's argument that it is the availability of
civil penalties, rather than their imposition that deters future misconduct.
Availability without actual imposition can become a hollow threat, suggested the
majority.5 3 Finally, the Court distinguished the facts in Steel Co., where the
violations were found to be entirely in the past, (hence citizens groups lacked
standing to sue), from the instant case, where the incidence and threat of future
violations established citizen group standing.5 4
Turning to the mootness issue, the Court, again, distinguished Steel Co. and
stated that where, as here, the record indicates a reasonable expectation that
defendant's misconduct could recur, defendant's voluntary compliance with the
law during the litigation process does not moot the case.55 Rather, voluntary
compliance alone creates a "formidable burden" on the defendant to show the
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id.
See id. at 703.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id.

49. Lujan v. Defenders of Wild Life, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).

50. The Court emphasized that it was injury to plaintiff - membership, not as Laidlaw had asserted,
injury to the environment that plaintiffs must demonstrate. See Friendsof the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 704.
51. See Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 704 (citing 504 U.S. 555).
52. See id. at 706 (citing precedent, including Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997) and
Tull v. United States,412 422-423 (1987)).

53. See id.
54. See id. at 707.
55. See id.at 708-09.

In so doing, the Court rejected ambiguous language in precedent

characterizing mootness as analytically equivalent to "standing set in a time frame." Id. at 709.
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alleged misconduct "could not reasonably be expected to recur., 56 Friends of the
Earth provides important clarifications to standing and mootness doctrines and
resolves some of the ambiguities that troubled the concurring justices in Steel Co.
Steel Co. presented two issues: did the citizen suit provision in the statute at issue
create citizen standing for entirely past violations of the statute and, if yes, did the
citizen group (again, an environmental advocacy group) have Article III
standing.57 Because the case could have been resolved by analyzing the first
question alone, the concurring justices found Justice Scalia's address of the
Constitutional issue ill-advised.5 8
The Steel Co. standing issue was raised in another suit this past term which
also implicated environmental issues. In Vermont Agency of NaturalResources v.
United States, 59 a former employee of the state agency brought a qui tam action on
behalf of the federal government alleging that the agency had submitted false
claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in connection with its
grant programs.6 One threshold issue and two issues on the merits were raised on
certiorari to the Court.
First, the threshold issue of standing: did the employee-relator, have
standing to sue on behalf of the EPA under the False Claims Act. 61 Citing Steel
Co. and applying Lujan's 62 3-pronged test, 63 the Court found that the employeerelator met the first prong of the test under a "representational standing" theory
akin to standing in assignor-assignee and subrogor-subrogee contexts. 64 The
injury-in-fact inflicted on the federal government by the false claims conferred
65
standing on the employee-relator as a "partial assignee of the United States."
This extension of the representational standing doctrine to qui tam suits clarifies
the Court's statement in Steel Co. that an interest in the mere "by product" of the
suit (in Steel Co., the Court was referring to the litigation costs reimbursement
sought by the advocacy litigants) is insufficiently related to an injury in fact to
confer standing.66
Having resolved the threshold issue of standing, the Court turned to the
questions raised on the merits under the False Claims Act: was a state included in
the class of "persons" who could be sued? And, if so, did the Act run afoul of 11h
Amendment immunity considerations? Perhaps chastened by the results of his

56. Id. (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1021 (1998). (Stevens, J.,

concurring).
58. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000).

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1860.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
See supranote 36 as clarified by Friendsof the Earth, 120 S. Ct. 693.
See supranotes 49-51 and accompanying text.
See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1863.

65. Id.

66. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83 (1998). The Court in Vermont Agency
confirmed this standing analysis by reference to a tradition of qui tam actions as they evolved in
England and were brought to the Colonies. See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1863-65.
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analytical overreaching in Steel Co.,67 Justice Scalia applied the presumption that
statutorily-designated class of "persons," like the relevant class in the False Claims
Act,63 does not include the government. Justice Scalia found that the legislative
history of the Act,69along with its provision for punitive damage awards, was
inconsistent with statutes sanctioning government wrongdoing. 70 He found that an
express exclusion of states as "persons" in a parallel statute ("sister scheme"), the
Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 71 also supported the presumption that
Congress did not intend that states be included in the term "persons." Because
the state of Vermont was not a "person" for purposes of the Act, Justice Scalia
was free to avoid the 11th Amendment issue but he could not resist a pointed
constitutional aside: "[W]e of course express no view on the question whether an
action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a state would run afoul of72the
score.,
Eleventh Amendment, but we note that there is 'serious doubt' on that
And, just as Justice Scalia could not resist a sidebar comment on a
Constitutional issue analytically unnecessary for the decision, so Justice Stevens in
his dissenting opinion could not resist the opportunity, having decided that the
majority's statutory analysis was in error, to reach the 11th Amendment issue and
to condemn the plurality's burgeoning 11th Amendment analysis in toto: "I
adhere to the view that Seminole Tribe... was wrongly decided." 73 Thus, even
with regard to a clearly-defined textual issue of statutory interpretation, resting on
a panoply of traditional canons of statutory construction, the overriding concern
of this Court with the larger federalism issues is evident.
The third case on the docket implicating environmental concerns was Public
Land Council v. Babbitt.74 At issue were Department of Interior regulations
promulgated under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934e5 with respect to grazing rights
on Western public lands. Several trade organizations representing ranching
businesses challenged 1995 amendments to the existing regulations as exceeding
the agency's authority under the Act. Specifically, the advocacy groups
challenged new "grazing preference" regulations which undermined ranchers'
expectations about their grazing rights and would, they argued, discourage lenders
from taking future mortgages on ranching operations.76 The advocacy group also
challenged an amended regulation that no longer required grazing permittees to
"be engaged in the livestock business." This amendment, the challengers argued,
was part of a plot to eliminate grazing on public lands. 77 And the third challenge
67. See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1865. Justice Scalia's exegesis on considering jurisdictional

issues first, a question that preoccupied him in Steel Co.
68. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1994).
69. See Vermont Agency, 120 S. Ct. at 1867-68.
70. See id. at 1869.
71. See id.at 1870.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1877 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Public Land Council v. Babbit, 120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000).
75. 43 U.S.C. § 315 et seq. (1994).
76. See PublicLand Council,120 S. Ct. at 1822.
77. See id. at 1825-26.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 36:153

was to a 1995 regulation conferring federal government title to all future
permanent improvements on public grazing lands. 8 Using traditional rules of
statutory construction, 79 a unanimous Court found all three regulations to be wellwithin the regulatory authority of the agency under the Act and consistent with
Congressional objectives reasonably to safeguard grazing privileges while
"preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration [and] provid[ing] for.., orderly
use, improvement and development of the public range." 80
TAXATION
In another unanimous decision, the Court in Hunt-Wesson a case
reminiscent of Allied-Signal, Inc.,81 held that while a state may tax a ratable share
of the "unitary income" of nondomiciliary corporations, it may not tax the
nonunitary business enterprise of a nondomiciliary.82 To do so, said the Court
violates the Due Process and Commerce Clause requirements of a minimum
nexus between interstate business activities and the State imposing the tax. In
Hunt-Wesson, the tax at issue was in fact, an exception to the general business
expenses deduction from gross income under California's taxing system.83 The
system permitted multi-state corporations to deduct interest cost but only the
amount that exceeded the nondomicilary's income from nonunitary businesses
unrelated to its California operations. In other words, income that California
could otherwise not tax. 84 Justice Breyer writing for the Court, directed California
legislators to ratio-based formulas used by other taxing jurisdictions for making a
reasonable attribution, not an across-the-board inclusion, of nonunitary income to
unitary business enterprises.85
The other tax case this term that impacts business interests identified the
date on which estimated income and withholding taxes are "paid" for purposes of
ascertaining whether taxpayer's payment was timely and therefore entitled him to
overpayment credit on tax obligations. 86 In the case of Baral v. U.S., taxpayer
remitted estimated tax payments for his 1988 tax year in addition to the
withholding tax attributable to the employer. However, he did not file a return or
his claim of overpayment until nearly 4 years later. The Service rejected his
overpayment credit claim on the grounds that no payment was made during the
(roughly) 3-year "look-back" period prescribed by statute!' The Court agreed
with the Service that estimated and withholding taxes are deemed "paid" on the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id. at 1826.
See id.
Id. at 1823.
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Directors, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,772 (1992).
Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 120 S. Ct. 1022 (2000).
Id. at 1025.
See id. at 1024-26.
See id. at 1028.
Baral v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1006 (2000).
See id. at 1007-08.
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closing date of the relevant taxable year (in this case, April 15, 1 9 8 9 ),s rather than
when the Service assesses tax liability (when the taxpayer files his return), 9
BANKRUPTCY

The Court expeditiously resolved two bankruptcy cases last term. In
Hartford UnderwritersInsurance Co. v. Union PlantersBank9 a unanimous Court
used the "plain meaning" rule in interpreting the Code to preclude administrative
costs to be charged against unrelated secured claims. In Hartford,the bankrupt
corporation first filed for Chapter 11 status and during the attempted
reorganization, it obtained workers' compensation insurance from Hartford.
When the reorganization failed and the case was converted to a Chapter 7
liquidation, Hartford attempted to charge the unpaid premiums of the policy to
Union Planters, a secured creditor. 9' Using plain meaning analysis, the Court
declared that 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) and (c) do not give administrative costs a
priority over secured claims.92
In the other bankruptcy case, Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 93 the
Court relied on the well-established rule that in bankruptcy proceedings, the state
law which created the underlying substantive claim governs those claims.94 In
Raleigh the underlying state claim was created by Illinois tax law. The case arose
in connection with the lease-purchase agreement under which a corporation,
Chandler Enterprises, purchased an airplane. Illinois tax law provides that if the
seller does not remit the sales tax on the transaction then the buyer is obligated to
pay it, or in default of payment, the obligation devolves personally to "any
corporate officer ... who willfully fails to file the return .... 95 The burden of
both production and persuasion also devolves to the officer.96 The Circuits have

been deeply divided over whether the general rule applying state substantive law
to state claims in bankruptcy also includes state allocation of the burden of
proof.97 The Court expressly granted certification to resolve the division; it
concluded that because "the burden of proof is an essential element of the claim
itself" state substantive law includes allocations of burdens of proof.9s
PATENT/TRADEMARK

An important patent case this term dealt with the growing trade in "knock-

88. See id. at 1008. See also §§ 6513(b)(1) and (2) of the I.R.C.
89. The taxpayer relied on the Fifth Circuit for this interpretation. See, Ford v. United States, 618
F. 2d 357, 360-61 n.4 (1980). The Court took the case to resolve a split in the circuits.
90. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 120 S. Ct. 1942 (2000).
91. See id. at 1945-46.
92. See id. at 1946-47.
93. Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 120 S. Ct. 1951 (2000).
94. Id. at 1952.
95. Id. at 1953.
96. See id. at 1954 (citing Branson v. Dept. of Revenue, 659 N.E.2d 961, 966-68 (Ill. 1995)).
97. See id. at 1955.
98. Id.
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off copies" of protected intellectual property. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc.,99 raised a statutory construction issue under the Lanham Act. 1' ° Under
contract, a producer of clothing supplied Wal-Mart with a line of children's clothes
that intentionally copied the design of an upscale designer/producer ("knockoffs"). 101 The designer/producer, Samara, sued alleging, inter alia, unregistered
trade dress infringement. Samara prevailed at trial. Wal-Mart challenged the
verdict on the grounds that the clothing was insufficiently distinctive to entitle it to
trade dress coverage. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as construed by case law,
protects "trade dress" - a class which includes not only labeling and packaging but
also design, where the trade dress is sufficiently distinctive so that a knock-off
would be likely to create consumer confusion.'0 Trade dress can be distinctive
either because it is "inherently distinctive" (the trade dress is universally
associated with the product, as in, for example, Camel cigarettes) 103 or distinctive
in the sense that it has acquired a "secondary meaning" for consumers, which
identifies the producer of the product for them (rather than inherently linking the
trade dress to the product itself)'0 4 and, it was this latter category of "secondary
meaning" that framed the trade dress issue in this case. 05 Product-design trade
dress, like the children's clothing line developed by Samara, can only have
Langham Act protection if the designer/producer can demonstrate the "secondary
meaning" association for consumers - a fact-intensive proof problem.
Applying this statutory framework to the case required a reversal of the
Second Circuit's affirmance of the plaintiff's verdict as a matter of law and a
remand for development of a record on the issue of whether Samara's productdesign had acquired the requisite "secondary meaning. 10 6 The Supreme Court's
imposition of a fact-specific determination in this case is certainly good news for
knock-off producers of designer clothes.
The only other patent case to come before the Court this term is more
properly classified as a civil practice case.
CIVIL PRACICE

In Nelson v. Adams, Inc.,1 7 a licensee company sued Adams, Inc. for patent
99.
100.
1125.
101.
102

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, See, esp., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 43, 45, 1127, 1052, 1114, 1057, 1065,
See Wal-Mart, 120 S. Ct. at 1341.
See id. The Court specifically stated that while § 43 (a) does not expressly require that the trade-

dress be "distinctive" courts have, without exception, imposed a showing of distinctiveness as an

unavoidable predicate to demonstrating the confusion identified at § 43(a).
103. See id. at 1343.
104. See id. The Court demonstrated that this case law categorization between the two kinds of
"distinctiveness" finds support in the Lanham Act at § 2. "Section 2 required that registration be
granted to any trademark 'by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of
others ... ."' Id.

105. The Court opined that clothing design, at issue in Wal-Mart is not inherently distinctive; hence,
to be protected the trade-dessing must identify the designer/producer in the public's mind.
106. Wal-Mart, 120 S. Ct. at 1345.
107. Nelson v. Adams, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1579 (2000).
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infringement. The trial court dismissed the suit and awarded litigation expenses to
the defendant, Adams, Inc. Fearing that the losing party, the licensee company,
would be unable to pay the award, Adams moved to amend under Rule 15 to add
the licensee's sole shareholder, individually, and under Rule 59(e) to include the
shareholder as a judgment defendant. The trial court granted the motions and
that judgment was affirmed by the Federal Circuit.1' s A unanimous Supreme
Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg summarily explained that
the lower courts' decisions short-circuited adequate procedural safeguards of due
notice and the opportunity to be heard. 0 9 The case was reversed and remanded to
afford the shareholder an adequate hearing. 110
A more far-reaching resolution was reached in Weisgram v. Marley Co.,"'
surely the Court's most important civil practice case in the 1999 term. Proving,
again, that its Daubert"2 precedent has real teeth, a unanimous Court fine-tuned
Daubertto hold, in Weisgram, that where a favorable verdict was reached on the
basis of unreliable expert testimony, subsequently found inadmissible, then - in
the proper case - a court may enter judgment for the opposing party without
further proceedings on the merits.
Weisgram was a products liability case in
which decedent's estate alleged that a residential fire was caused by a defective
electric heater. The estate proffered the testimony of three alleged experts in
support of the claim. Defendant manufacturer objected, unsuccessfully, on the
basis that Federal Rules of Evidence 702, as explicated by Daubert,rendered the
expert testimony inadmissible. The trial court overruled defendant's Daubert
objections each time they were raised: pre-trial, during trial and post-trial. The
Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the expert testimony speculative and unscientific.
It found the remaining evidence against defendant insufficient to support the
estate's verdict and directed judgment for the defendant.114 Because of a split in
the circuits on the issue of whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 permits a directed verdict in
this context, the Court granted certification and ruled that Weisgram was an
appropriate case for a Rule 50 directed judgment as a matter of law."15 Where, as
here, the Court said, the verdict winner has notice of a substantial challenge to the
probative strength of his expert witness testimony, it behooves him to buttress that
testimony with supplementary evidence during trial." 6 Moreover, said the Court,
since Daubert "parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of exacting
11 7
standards of reliability such evidence must meet.
Business litigants now have a substantial body of law on the issue of expert

108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 1580-83.
See id. at 1583-85.
See id. at 1586-87.
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000).

112. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Weisgram, 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000).
See id. at 1015-16.
Id.
See id. at 1020.
Id.
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witnesses. In rapid succession, cases have developed this new evidentiary
doctrine. Beginning with Daubert,the Court declared that the trial court's duty as
"gatekeeper" requires it to evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony on the
basis, not only of its relevancy, but also its reliability. 1 8 In General Electric
Company v. Joiner,1 9 the first of the Daubertprogeny, the Court held that a trial

court's Daubert rulings would be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. 12° In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,12' the Court extended the reach of
Daubert's application to include not only scientific testimony, but all expert
testimony. 22 Now Weisgram adds that litigants are ill-advised to rely too heavily
on expert testimony even where challenges to reliability are overruled at trial.
CIVIL RICO

The Court addressed two interesting civil RICO cases last term. In Beck v.
Prupis,l 23 the Court held that employment termination for refusal to participate in
a RICO conspiracy was not the kind of injury to "business or property"
envisioned by § 1964(c) of RICO.'2 4 Section 1964(c) provides that "[a]ny person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962" has
standing to bring a civil RICO action. l -' And section of 1962 identifies
racketeering and conspiracy to racketeer as predicate acts. 126 Racketeering is
defined at § 1961(1) to include extortion, and mail and wire fraud.'27 The former
president of an insurance company (Southeastern Insurance Group) alleged that
certain officers and directors of the company were engaged in racketeering
activity and that he was fired in furtherance of that conspiracy because he refused
28 By a majority of 8-2, the Court resolved a split in the circuits 129 by
to join it.
holding that the allegations did not provide the former president with a RICO
action because the termination, the "overt act", was not, itself, a "racketeering
activity."' 3 The majority relied on the rule of statutory construction that, in the
absence of express language to the contrary, courts must infer that Congress
incorporated common law definitions and settled meanings of the terms it
employs. The term "conspiracy" at common law requires more than a common
1 31
plan, "there must be acts of a tortious character in carrying it into execution.
This fundamental common law principle which limits the reach of civil conspiracy

118. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579,589 (1993).
119. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
120. Id. at 517.

121. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1998).
122 Id.
123. Beck v.Prupis, 120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000).

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1617.
Id. at 1610 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).
See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962).
See id. at 1608 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)).
See id. at 1612.
See Beck, 120 S. Ct. at 1613.
See id.
Id. at 1614 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876, cmt. b (1977)).
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was deemed incorporated into civil RICO. Hence the majority concluded that
"injury [here, termination] caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering
or otherwise wrongful under RICO ...is not sufficient.... ,132In a strongly-

worded and cryptic dissent, Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joined,
reached the opposite conclusion, arguing the plain meaning rule: to require the
conclusion that because RICO does not expressly require the overt act to be33
racketeering activity, the Court may not read that requirement into the statute.
Furthermore, said the dissent, the majority relied on case law precedent which was
inapposite and not relevant to the analysis required in the case. 134
The other civil RICO case this term, Ratella v. Wood, 135 gave a unanimous
Court the opportunity to clarify the boundaries of RICO's 4-year statute of
limitations. Rotella, former patient at a psychiatric facility, sued the facility some
8 years after he was discharged when the facility was implicated in a criminal fraud
scheme. 136 Rotella alleged that he was retained as a patient not for medical
reasons but solely in connection with this fraudulent scheme to maximize
profits.137 The District Court invoked the "injury discovery rule" and held that
equitable tolling applied his claim when he discovered his injury (eight years
before he brought suit). The 5th Circuit upheld the District Court's ruling. Other
circuits had adopted "the injury and pattern discovery" rule which states that the
period begins to run when plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury and
the pattern of racketeering that caused it.13s In Rotella, the Court found that an
injury and discovery rule would preserve a cause of action for an unreasonable
period of time and therefore rejected it.1 39 Rotella, completes the Court's
development of an applicable statute of limitations under civil RICO.
Because civil RICO itself did not provide a limitations period, the Supreme
Court in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,140 established a 4year statute of limitations for the action, reasoning that a RICO claim was
analogous to a Clayton Act claim. 141 Subsequently, the Circuits split three ways in
applying the limitations period: 1) some circuits (like the 5th Circuit in Rotella)
adopted a strict injury discovery rule (the period starts to run when plaintiff
should have discovered the injury); 2) some invoked the injury and pattern
discovery rule discussed above; and 3) the Third Circuit fashioned a "last
predicate act" rule (the clock starts to run again after each predicate act in the

132. Id. at 1616.
133. See id. at 1617. (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is an interesting example of Karl Llewellyn's
insight that statutory construction rules always cut two ways. See generally, Karl. N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules on Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed,3 VAND.L. REV. 395 (1950).
134. See Beck, 120 S.Ct. at 1616.
135. Rotella v. Wood, 120 S. Ct. 1075 (2000).
136. See id. at 1078.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1079.
140. Agency Holding Corp. v. Ma~ley-Duff and Associates, 483 U.S. 143,156 (1987).
141. Id. at 143.
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pattern).
In Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., the Supreme Court rejected the Third
Circuit's "last predicate act" rule as creating actions so remote in time as to be
"beyond any limit that Congress could have contemplated.''
For the same
reason, in Rotella; the Court rejected the "injury and pattern" discovery rule.
Thus, it is now beyond dispute that the injury discovery rule applies to civil
RICO's court-fashioned 4-year statute of limitations.
OTHER FEDERAL STATUTES

The Supreme Court was asked to construe provisions in four other federal
statutes that merit at least a cursory review.
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater,M a subcontractor challenged the
constitutionality of the Small Business Act when his low bid in a highway
construction project was rejected in favor of a company that had been certified as
a disadvantaged business. A business was deemed disadvantaged if it was owned
and controlled by socially or economically disadvantaged groups which include,
"black, Hispanic, Asia Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, and Native American... and
in addition presume that women are socially disadvantaged., 145 The rejected
bidder in this case was a white male and he alleged that the race-based priorities
violated his 5th Amendment right to equal protection. The Small Business Act at
§ 8(d)(i) expresses a federal policy favoring contracts with small "disadvantaged"
businesses. 146 The applicable law which effectuated the policy in this case, the
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, gives a priority to
disadvantaged business.147 Under the Act, the Small Business Administration and
state highway agencies certify businesses as "disadvantaged" for purposes of these
statutes.' 48 In Adarand Contractors, the Tenth Circuit analyzed petitioner's
constitutional challenge to the laws by applying an intermediate scrutiny test and
upheld them. The Supreme Court ruled that because race-based classifications
were involved, a strict scrutiny test was mandated. The Court, therefore, reversed
and remanded. On remand, the District Court held that the preferential measures
failed the strict scrutiny test. In response to this ruling, the state (Colorado)
amended its certification rules to include, under the rubric "disadvantaged"
company, majority owners who have "experienced social disadvantage based
on... [race] .... " Under this new classification scheme, the white petitioner
was certified as "disadvantaged." In the interim, respondents appealed the
District Court's strict scrutiny ruling to the Tenth Circuit. And finding that
petitioner had now been certified, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the case as moot.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, again, found the Tenth Circuit in
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179,185-86 (1997).
Id.at 187.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000).
Id. at 723.
Pub. L. 87-305,75 Stat. 667, as amended,15 U.S.C. § 637(d)(1) (1994, Supp. IV).
Publ L. 102-240, § 1003(b), 105 Stat. 1919.

148. See Adarand Contractors,120 S. Ct. at 723.

149. Id. at 724.
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error. This time on the grounds of confusing mootness and standing (the same
confusion it sought to resolve in Friendsof the Earth).50 The distinction is critical,
said the Court, because of the appropriate burdens of proof that attach to each
threshold issue. Here, a proper ruling of mootness would require a finding by the
court that the voluntary cessation of the improper conduct, in this case, on the part
of the government) would not recur. This is the government's heavy burden to
prove. Because the Department of Transportation's regulations do not yet
comport with the State's new certification procedures, the government can not
meet its burden.151 Once again, the case has been reversed and remanded.
The Court reviewed the venue provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
(Act) in Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co.112 Viewing
arguably conflicting venue provisions in the Act, the Court analyzed the
provisions through the prisms of their "history and function" and ruled that they
were permissive; thereby allowing a motion to confirm, vacate or modify an
arbitration award to be brought "in any district proper under the general venue
'
statute."153
Cortez Byrd follows the pattern of many business related cases this
term: a unanimous (or strong majority) opinion premised on traditional rules of
statutory construction, that resolve an ongoing split among the Circuits on the
issue.
Fischer v. United States,'54 directed the Court's attention to the federal
bribery statute 155 and its application to the Medicare program. The class of
putative defendants covered by the federal bribery statute includes organizations
which "receiv[e], in any, one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a
federal program." 156 The issue in Fischerwas whether the term "benefits" in the
statute includes Medicare disbursements to health care organizations for the
express benefit of qualifying patients. By an 8-2 majority, the Court ruled that it
did. 5 7 In so doing, the Court distinguished healthcare providers who receive the
"benefits" as reimbursement for their participation in a highly regulated
government assistance program and other private sector companies who contract
with the government outside of such a structure. 158 Not every payment by the
government for services rendered under contract qualities as a "benefit" for
purposes of the bribery statute.
A high profile case, FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation,'"
which split the Court in a 5-4 decision, used traditional rules of statutory
construction to determine that the FDA had no authority to regulate tobacco

150. See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text.
151. See Adarand Contractors,120 S. Ct. at 725.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 120 S.Ct. 1331 (2000).
Id. at 1334.
Fischer v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1780 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1994).
Fischer,120 S. Ct. at 1782 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(b)).
See id. at 1782.
See id. at 1787.
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S.Ct. 1291 (2000).
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products under the FDCA. 6° The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Act) gives the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) jurisdiction to regulate "drugs"
"devises"1 61 and "combination products."'1 62 In 1996, the FDA determined that
nicotine was a drug and that cigarettes are devises for delivering drugs; therefore
the agency had authority to regulate them. Accordingly, the FDA promulgated
two kinds of regulations with regard to tobacco products: access regulations
(aimed at curtailing access to tobacco by children and adolescents)' 63 and
promotion regulations (proscribing certain kinds of advertising).'t6 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas
ruled that these regulations were beyond the purview of the agency's authority. In
support of that ruling, Justice O'Connor, citing Chevron'65 and its ubiquitous
progeny, declared that where, as in the instant case, Congress had not expressly
stated whether it had granted an agency authority in a particular area, then166the
statute at issue must be read as a whole in order to infer Congressional intent.
From that perspective, Justice O'Connor inferred that a basic objective of
the FDA was to "ensure that any product regulated by the FDA is 'safe' and
'effective' for its intended use."1 67 And because the agency had "exhaustively
documented that tobacco products were unsafe for their intended use, 163 the
agency's only logical recourse under the Act was to remove them from the market
as "misbranded devices." A drug or devise is "misbranded" if it is dangerous
when used in the manner prescribed by the producer.1 69 But, said Justice
O'Connor, the FDA is precluded from removing tobacco products from the
market by 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a).' 70 Analyzing section 1311 in conjunction with six
other statutes that deal with health issues related to tobacco use reveals an implicit
Congressional intent to regulate tobacco products on health issues rather than
remove them from the market. 71 The dissent challenged the result, calling Justice
O'Connor's reading of the "misbranding" provision unpersuasive. "[S]urely wrote
Justice Breyer (with whom Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined) the
agency can determine that a substance is comparatively 'safe' (not 'dangerous')
[for its intended use and, therefore, misbranded] whenever it would be less

160. See, applicable Sections of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act at 52 Stat. 1040, as amended,21
U.S.C. §§ 301; 321 (g)-(h); 353 (g)(1), 393 (1994 and Supp. III).
161. Id. at § 321(g)-(h) and § 393.
162. Id. at § 353 (g)(i).
163. See Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1298.
164. See id. at 1298-99.
165. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
166. See Brown & Williamson, 120 S. Ct. at 1300-01.
167. Id. at 1301 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2) (1999, Supp. III)).
168. Id. at 1302.
169. See id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 3520) (1994)).
170. Which states in relevant part, "tihe marketing of tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic
industries of the United States with ramifying activities which directly affect interstate and foreign
commerce at every point, and stable conditions therein are necessary to the general welfare." 7 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (1994).
171. See Brown & Williamson, 120 S.Ct. at 1304. The Court also noted the agency's longstanding
refusal to regulate tobacco products prior to 1996, as beyond its authority. See id. at 1296-97.
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dangerous to make the product available (subject to regulatory requirements)
than suddenly to withdraw it from the market."1 72 And further, "[t]he statute's
language... permits the agency to choose remedies consistent with its basic
purpose - the overall protection of public health."' 73 The 5-4 decision lobs this
political ball back into the legislative court for a definitive resolution.
EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

Three cases involving employment benefits; two ERISA cases and one
brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, were decided this term. Of the two
ERISA cases,
the one with the most far-reaching consequences was Pegram v.
74
Hendrich.'
Pegram involved a physician incentive program under a health maintenance
plan. As the public has become aware, one principal way that health maintenance
organizations (H.M.O.'s) hold down health care costs is by giving physicians a
financial incentive (a share in net profits) for rationing or limiting medical care.'75
In simplified form, a health maintenance plan rather than charging (directly or by
way of traditional health insurance coverage) on a fee-for-service basis, charges a
fixed fee up front for all treatment rendered over a fixed period of time. In order
to glean a profit from this fixed fee arrangement, HMO's have instituted a variety
of cost-cutting measures. A financial incentive arrangement with treating
physicians is one of those measures and it was just such an arrangement that was
at issue in Pegram. 76 Mrs. Hendrich was covered by a pre-paid health plan offered
by State Farm, her husband's employer. The contracting HMO was physicianowned and Pegram was the treating physician/owner in Mrs. Hendrich's case.
Hendrich suffered a ruptured appendix under Pegram's care when Pegram
delayed a critical diagnostic procedure after discovering a large inflammation in
Hendrich's abdomen.'" Hendrich sued Pegram and the HMO in state court and
the case reached the Supreme Court in a significantly roundabout way. Hendrich
sued under state law claims of medical malpractice and fraud. Pegram and the
HMO responded with a preemption argument pursuant to ERISA, removed the
case to federal court where it sought summary judgment. Hendrich, then,
amended her complaint to include a claim under ERISA that the HMO breached
its fiduciary duty to act "solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries... ."7 8 And, as the Court notably points out, it was Hendrich's
ERISA claim in her amended complaint and not the defendants' removal to
federal court on ERISA preemption grounds that brought the case to the Court's
172. Id. at 1323 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 1324.
174. Pegram v. Hendrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
175. Indeed, so significant is the issue in the minds of the public that the decision in Pegram was
awarded front page coverage in the N.Y. Times. See, Linda Greenhouse, HMO's Win CrucialRuling
on Liabilityfor Doctor'sActs, NY TIMES, June 13,2000, at Al.

176. Pegram,120 S. Ct. at 2145.
177. See id. at 2146-47.
178. Id. at 2151 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1134(a)(i)).
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attention. 179 Hence, the issue of whether removal was proper, like many other
contiguous issues in this case, was left for another day, and-perhaps-another
1
forum. 8
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, fashioned the specific issue
before it this way: "The question in this case is whether treatment decisions made
by a health maintenance organization, acting through its physician employees, are
fiduciary acts within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. ' ' 181 In deciding that they were not, the Court first explained its
reversal of the Seventh Circuit which had held that, while financial incentive plans
do not "automatically" breach ERISA fiduciary obligations, the facts in this case
did constitute a breach.'8 That distinction, on a fact-specific basis, wrote Justice
Souter, thrusts the Court into an arena where it is not well-suited to perform.
[N]o HMO organization could survive without some incentive connecting physician
reward with treatment rationing. The essence of an HMO is that salaries and profits
are limited by the HMO's fixed membership fees, [therefore any factual distinction
based on treatment decisions compels the Court to]... draw a line between
good
1
and bad HMO's ... a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk. 8
Souter concluded, "[b]ut such complicated fact-finding and such a debatable
social judgment are not wisely required of courts... '[C]ongress is far better
equipped than the judiciary...' to make these fact-intensive public policy
decisions.' 4 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's fact-based distinction was rejected by the
Court. All HMO's and their financial-incentive tinged treatment decisions are to
be treated alike, for purposes of the ERISA issue.
Turning to ERISA, Justice Souter was at pains, first, to distinguish ERISA
fiduciaries, who may have financial interests adverse to their beneficiaries, 18 and
common law trustee fiduciaries,186 who must act solely in the beneficiaries'
financial interest.' 7 That is, ERISA principals owe a fiduciary duty to
beneficiaries when acting in their role in making "treatment decisions.""' But
"treatment decisions" are inextricably bound to "eligibility decisions" under

179. See id.
Hendrich does not contest the propriety of removal before us, and we take no position on
whether or not the case was properly removed. As we will explain, Hendrich's amended
complaint alleged ERISA violations, over which the federal courts have jurisdiction, and we
therefore have jurisdiction regardless of the correctness of the removal.
Id. at 2148 n.2 (citations omitted).
180. Indeed, a major concern in this case, whether the current health care delivery system should
permit the kind of financial incentive arrangement that can conflict with a physician's professional
obligations, was pointedly referred to the legislative forum. See id. at 2157.
181. Id at 2146.
182 See Pegram,120S. Ct. at 2148.
183. Id. at 2150.
184. Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-666 (1994)).
185. See id. at 2151.
186. As Justice Souter explains, however, the ERISA fiduciary concept is derived from common law
trust law regarding fiduciaries. See id. at 2151-2152.
187. See id. (quoting 2A A Scott & W. Fratcher, Trusts § 170,311 (4th ed. 1987)).
188. Pegram,120 S. Ct. at 2154.
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HIIMO plans. Eligibility decisions are non-fiduciary administrative decisions that
unapologetically implicate the financial interests of the doctors and their HMOs. 89
Indeed, these eligibility questions are another principal cost-controlling device
under the current health maintenance system.' 90 Justice Souter concluded that
treatment decisions (like the one in Pegram) which are unavoidably mixed with
eligibility decisions, were not intended by Congress to be cast as fiduciary
decisions because to conclude otherwise would serve to eliminate profit from the
health maintenance system 191 And, not to belabor the point, he added, "[i]t is
enough to recognize that the Judiciary has no warrant to precipitate the upheaval
that would follow a refusal to dismiss Hendrich's ERISA claim."' 192 In the larger
scheme, Souter's opinion leaves more questions unanswered than answered.
What about removal? Is it appropriate? The opinion expressly declined to
answer.193 And as to the related question of pre-emption, does ERISA pre-empt
an "unmixed" or "pure" case of eligibility decision-making by HMOs and their
doctors? 194 And what legal significance can we attach to footnote eight where the
Court alludes to a possible fiduciary duty to disclose features of an HMO plan
including physician incentive/profit sharing provisions that may serve to limit
treatment?195 Undoubtedly, we can anticipate that subsequent cases will raise
these unanswered questions.' 6 One question, however, was unambiguously
answered in Pegram: the Court has resolved - unanimously, unabashedly and
deftly - to use judicial restraint to avoid becoming the fall guy with regard to major
public policy health care issues in this high stakes, high profile arena that
ostensibly pits corporate profits against patient care. 197
189. See id.
190. See id. at 2148 ("HMOs, like traditional insurers, will ...make coverage determinations... to
make sure that a request for care falls within the scope of covered circumstances.., or that a given
treatment falls within the scope of care promised").
191. Hendrich's fiduciary theory would result in "nothing less than elimination of the for-profit
HMO... [and] might well portend the end of nonprofit HMOs as well, since those HMOs can set
doctors' salaries." Id. at 2156 & n.11.
192. Id. at 2156.
193. See supra notes 179, 180 and accompanying text.
194. See Pegram,120 S. Ct. at 2158 (Souter dubs it the "puzzling issue" of preemption).
195. See id. at 2154 n.8:
Although we are not presented with the issue here, it could be argued that Carle [the HMO
in Pegram] is a fiduciary insofar as it has discretionary authority to administer the plan, and
so it is obligated to disclose characteristics of the plan and of those who provide services to
the plan, if that information affects beneficiaries' material interests.
196. See, e.g. Greenhouse, supra,note 175, identifying litigation premised on a disclosure duty theory
and quoting plaintiff's lawyer, Jerome Marcus, for the proposition that nondisclosure can be shown to
result in unjust enrichment for HMOs.
197. To drive the point home one more time, Justice Souter opines, near the end of the decision:
If Congress wishes to restrict its approval of HMO practice to certain preferred forms, it may
choose to do so. But the Federal Judiciary would be acting contrary to the congressional
policy... if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending wholesale attacks on
existing HMOs solely because of their structure ....

Pegram,120 S. Ct. at 2157.
One thing, however, that the opinion does do is to put the unadorned issue before the American
people: should our national health care system structurally endorse physician incentive plans that pit
the physician's financial well-being against his/her patients' health care. As Justice Souter points out,
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The other ERISA case this term, HarrisTrust and Savings Bank v. Salomon
Smith Barney,198while important was less dramatic. It, too, concerned the role of
fiduciaries under ERISA's provision, but it specifically addressed the issues of
whether a nonfiduciary which is party to transactions prohibited by ERISA might
be sued under its provisions. 199 In another unanimous decision, the Court said that
it could. The case arose when an ERISA pension plan enlisted the broker-dealer
services of Salomon. Assuming that Salomon became a "party-in-interest"' 2
pursuant to § 3(14)(B) of ERISA,2 1 because it acted as broker-dealer, it was
precluded from engaging in certain transactions with the plan."" Salomon
allegedly engaged in a prohibited transaction with the plan, when it sold several
motels it owned to the plan. When it became apparent that the motels were
worthless, Harris Bank as plan trustee, and other fiduciaries sued Salomon under
502(a)(3) of ERISA. Section 502(a)(3) authorizes a fiduciary to bring suit to
enjoin or to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" for violations of ERISA. 203
Salomon argued, and the Seventh Circuit agreed, that the prohibited transaction
at issue was covered by § 406(a) of the Act and it expressly authorizes suit for
redress only against a fiduciary, not a nonfiduciary 3rd party or party-in-interest
which described Salomon's status in the case."' 4 Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, agreed that § 406 provides sole redress against fiduciaries, 205 but he added
that § 502(a)(3) 2 6 is not similarly constrained.
It provides that "(a) A civil action may be brought... (3) by a... fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act.., which violates... [ERISA]... or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations ....
,20

Thus,

2
502(a)(3) admits of no limit... on the universe of possible defendants., 11
Accordingly, the trustee's suit against Salomon seeking rescission of the
prohibited transaction, restitution of the motels purchase price and disgorgement
of Salomon's profits in the proscribed motel transaction were well with the
purview of a § 502(a)(3) civil action. 209
The other case involving employee benefits law this term fell under the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the issue before the Court was
whether a public employer, consistent with FLSA, could compel its employees to
use accrued compensatory time-off ("compensatory time") in lieu of over-time

that is
198.
199.
200.

precisely what the current structure does.
Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000).
See id. at 2184.
Id. at 2185.

201. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B) which defines party-in-interest as "'a person providing services to'...

an ERISA plan." See HarrisTrust, 120 S. Ct. at 2185.

202. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (a); Section 406(a) of ERISA.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See HarrisTrust, 120 S. Ct. at 2184 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).
See id. at 2185.
See id. at 2186.
See id. at 2186-87.
Id.at 2186.
Id.

209. See Harris Trust, 120 S. Ct. at 2185.
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pay. By a vote of 6 to 3 the Court in Christensen v. Harris County,210 held that it
could.
FLSA requires that "hourly employees who work in excess of 40 hours per
week must be compensated for the excess hours at a rate not less than 1 times
their regular hourly wage." 2n The "compensatory time" dispensation to public
employers, however, was limited by the following constraints: 1) employers must
permit employees to use their compensatory time within a reasonable period
following an employee request; 2) a cap of maximum overtime hours that could be
"paid" in time rather than cash was established; and 3) an employee could cash212
out accrued compensatory time upon termination.
The issue before the Court in Christensen was whether a sheriff's department
could avoid the effects of the cap (once the statutory cap of compensatory hours
was reached, employees must be compensated in cash for overtime) by compelling
overtime employees to use accrued "compensatory time. 2 13 Sheriff employees
and the United States in an amicus brief, argued that FLSA implicitly precludes
that practice because it grants employees at § 207 the right to use compensatory
time within a reasonable period after they request it.214 Rejecting what the Court
asserted was petitioners attempt to cast the section under the canon "expressio
unis est exclusio alterius" (that because the section puts control of compensatory
time use primarily in the hands of employees, employers are precluded from
compelling its use),215 the Court simply found that FLSA at § 207 does not state an
on
exclusive method for instigating the use of compensatory time. It concluded,
216
FLSA.
violate
not
did
issue
at
plan
department
sheriffs
the
that
that basis,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

While the results of the employment benefits cases this term were
moderately pro-business, a major employment discrimination case this term was
distinctly bad news for the business community Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products 217 was a case involving age discrimination but its ramifications touch all
manner of discrimination-in-the-workplace issues. Developing and clarifying its
1993 decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,218 the Court addressed the
issues of shifting burdens of proof and of going forward with the evidence in
discrimination cases. Specifically, whether plaintiffs' prima facie case coupled
with evidence sufficient to show that an employer's proffered reason for
210. Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655,1658 (2000).
211. Id. at 1659.
212. See id. at 1660-63.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 1666. Justice Stevens, in dissent, said that canon mischaracterized petitioners
argument. He argued that a proper reading of § 207 in this context is that, absent an agreement with its
employees granting the power, public employers have no right under FLSA to compel use of

compensatory time.
215. See id. at 1661.
216. See Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1661.
217. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).

218. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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discrimination was pretextual is sufficient to meet plaintiff's ultimate burden of
proof of age discrimination. 9
In Reeves, plaintiff filed an age discrimination suit in federal court alleging
that he had been discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). He prevailed at the District Court level but
the Fifth Circuit reversed, explaining that, while plaintiff had offered evidence
sufficient to establish his prima facie case and that he also "'very well may' have
offered sufficient evidence... [that the employer's proffered reason was
pretextual] this was 'not dispositive' of the ultimate issue... 'whether Reeves
presented sufficient evidence that his age motivated... [the discharge]."' 22
The Circuits have been split on the issue presented in Reeves. However, all
Circuits have analyzed the issue within the McDonnell Douglas 2n framework of
shifting and ultimate burdens. Therefore, the Court assumed, without deciding,
that McDonnell Douglas presented the proper analytical structure for framing the
issueY2 McDonnell Douglas and its progeny have stated that, once plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of going forward with
the evidence shifts to defendant to produce evidence of a nondiscriminatory
reason for discharge. 224 If defendant meets its burden of production, as in Reeves,
then "[t]he presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come
forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture." 225 And it was at this
point that some confusion arose among Circuits applying the shifting burden
model. It was clear that plaintiff bore the ultimate burden of proof and that, "in
attempting to satisfy this burden, [plaintiff must be given] 'the opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were... a pretext for discrimination. ' m226 And it was also clear from
precedent that proof of pretext alone may not be enough to compel judgment as a
matter of law.2z7 But some courts, including the Court of Appeals in Reeves, had
construed precedent to require additional proof of discrimination, disregarding
plaintiff's evidence which established his prima facie case. In making its finding
with regard to plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof, "the Court of Appeals ignored
the evidence supporting petitioner's prima facie case and... confined its review of
evidence favoring petitioner to that evidence showing... [that employer's
proffered reasons were pretext]."
This was an error. In ruling as a matter of
law, the court must look to all the evidence on the record (including plaintiff's
prima facie case) and ask whether a reasonable jury could ultimately conclude that

219. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2103.
220.

d at 2103 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.).

221. Id. at 2104.
222. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
223. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2104.

224.
225.
226.
227.
22&

St.Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Id. at 2748 (citations omitted).
Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2105.
See id. at 2107.
Id. at 2108.
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the employer intentionally discriminated2 9
Reeves does several things. First, it clarifies Justice Scalia's somewhat
confusing opinion in Hicks.23° Second, it makes it clear that discrimination cases
are penultimately cases to be decided by the trier of fact.23' That, in turn, means
that employer summary judgment motions, will, in most cases be viewed with
disfavor. Practitioners of employment discrimination law also forecast that,
following Reeves, legal issues will be primarily evidentiary in nature: how much
weight should be given to statistical evidence used by plaintiff to show pretext?
And how should courts assess the probative value of derogatory, discriminatory
remarks (dubbed "stray comments") by managers?232 There is little doubt,
however, that the prospect of lengthy trials, and the severely diminished
expectation of summary rulings will encourage settlements in these cases.
FEDERALISM

The other employment discrimination case to come before the Court in the
1999 term was also an extremely important one, but I have catalogued it with the
federalism cases because that is primarily where its significance lies. Kimel v.
FloridaBoard of Regents 3 joins that line of cases that continues to develop and
will finally explain Rehnquistian Federalism. And while most of the businessrelated cases in recent terms have reflected the moderately pro-business consensus
of previous terms, and entail incremental doctrinal development premised largely
on traditional modes of statutory construction, in the federalism arena, businessrelated issues have yielded highly-conflicted dramatic decisions.2 Writing for the
Court in Kimels Justice O'Connor pitted the 11th Amendment against the 14th
Amendment to rule that while Congress clearly intended to abrogate the state's
immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, (ADEA),S section 5 of

the 14th Amendment did not include discrimination based on age so that the
attempted abrogation must fail.u 7 The ADEA forbids employers from making

229. See id.
230. St. Mary's, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
231. From the plaintiff bar's point of view this is decidedly positive outcome. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle,
Dismissal of Bias Suits Harder,NAT'L. L. J., June 26, 2000, BI col 1 (quoting Paul Mollica, for the
proposition that Reeves should "discourage companies from filing 'groundless' summary judgment
motions. That is really the scourge of the employment field - lengthy, exhibit - heavy summary
judgment motions that have to be responded to just to decide whether you get to the jury") (citations
omitted).
232. Id. (quoting, Jay W. Walks, predicting that Reeves enhances the weight of statistical evidence
and that "stray comments" may often be viewed as "too remote" to be probative).
233. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
234. See, e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
235. Parts I, II and IV were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas, Part III joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part, concurring in part was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. Justice Thomas' dissent to Part III was joined by Justice Kennedy.
236. 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994 ed).
237. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 637.
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employment decisions on the basis of age unless age238 constitutes a bona fide job
qualification (b.f.o.q.). 239 In 1974 Congress extended coverage of the ADEA to
include public employers. 240 In Kimel, plaintiffs alleged that their public employer
had violated ADEA strictures.241
Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the ADEA validly abrogates the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.242
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of anotherState, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. (emphasis
added)
In Seminole Tribe243 the Court extended the reach of the amendment's text
to include preclusion of suits by any private citizens against any state (even his/her
own state). Seminole Tribe went on to declare that Article I does not confer
Congressional authority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity "'Even when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area...."'244
Thus, while the Court had previously ruled that the 10th
Amendment is not a bar to ADEA suits against state employers,245 the ADEA
must also clear the 11th Amendment hurdle. This it can do, opined Justice
O'Connor, only if Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to age
discrimination. Section 5 expressly grants Congress the authority to enforce the
provisions of the 14th Amendment which, at Section 1 precludes states from
abridging the "privileges or immunities" of U.S. citizens or depriving "any person"
of due process or denying "any person" equal protection of the laws. Age
classifications, however, do not rise to Section 1 protected rights. The Court
reached this conclusion by relying on its "congruence and proportionality" test,
fashioned in City of Boerne,24 that there must be a congruent and proportional
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the legislation
designed to protect it.
247
Applying that test in FloridaPrepaid
the Court found that Congress had
not identified a pattern of patent infringement by the States, hence the legislation
at issue, the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, was
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

ADEA, supranote 236 at29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
Id. at § 623(f)(1).
See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 637.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 639.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1991) (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of

Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). See also, Hans v. Courscana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) all of which are
cited in support of the recent rendering of the 11th Amendment.
244. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 642 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72).
245. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 (1983) which "held that the ADEA constitutes valid
exercise of Congress' power... [under the Commerce Clause] Art I, § 8, cl. 3. and that the Act did not
transgress any external restraints imposed on the commerce clause by the Tenth Amendment."
246. City ofBoerno v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997).
247. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199,2207
(1999).
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out of proportion to the wrong it sought to remedy. The legislation was
unconstitutional under § 5 of the 14th Amendment. Since the legislation could not
avail itself of 14th Amendment justification, it must fail under the Eleventh
Amendment.
Similarly, said the Kimel Court, the ADEA's application to states is not
justified by the 14th Amendment because age does not describe the kind of
"discrete and insular minority" deserving of Equal Protection classification.
"States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. ' , 248 The ADEA's b.f.o.q. test is out of proportion to the rational
basis test because it imposes a much stricter burden of proof on state employers.
While Kimel becomes one more brick in the wall of Rehnquistian federalism,
it may also draw attention to the analytical inconsistencies and ambiguities of the
emerging doctrine. If Florida Prepaid ran afoul of the "congruence and
proportionality" 249 test because the legislative history of the patent statute at issue
failed to reveal a pattern of state violations, then why did not the Court address
the parallel issue in Kimel? Did the legislative history of the ADEA, as amended
to include state employees, uncover a pattern of age discrimination by states? If
so, why was that not at least germane to Kimel analysis if it was pivotal in Florida
Prepaid?2' But whatever its analytical flaws, Kimel and its predecessors clearly
teach that private litigants including business interests seeking redress against
state action will have significantly diminished legal territory in which to maneuver.
Beyond that indisputable fact, there is much ambiguity in the emerging doctrine.
Indeed, commentators even differ on how to categorize the various theoretical
constructs on which the federalism doctrine is premised. Each of the cases that
have contributed to the doctrine have been premised on one or more of the
following Constitutional theories: exercises of Congressional power pursuant to
asserted 1) Commerce Clause or 2) 14th Amendment authority and limitations on
that power pursuant to 3) the 10th Amendment or the 4) 11th Amendment. Each
theoretical construct has resulted in sharply divided opinions that are arguably
doctrinally opaque, if not inconsistent. However, as the 1999 term illustrates,
federalism issues are not limited to the foregoing analytical theories but must
surely include preemption analysis as well. In addition, preemption may emerge
as less divisive venue for developing doctrinal clarity and consensus in the
appropriate federalism cases. With that in mind, I have classified this term's

248. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
249. Id. at 646-47.
250. Some commentators view Kimel in conjunction with United States v. Morrison as an unhealthy
trend barring federal protection of human rights. See, Walter Dellinger and Jonathon Hacker, NAT'L
L.J., August 7,2000, at A28, col. 1. See also, United States. v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1578 (2000) (striking
down key provision of Violence Against Women Act on Commerce Clause and 14th Amendment
grounds). Legislative history in support of federal legislation does not, it would seem, cut both ways
with the Court. In United States v. Morrison for example, Congress assiduously documented the
distinctive effect of gender-based violence on interstate commerce to no avail. See Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytech Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 913 (4th Cir. 1999) (cited in Shane, supranote 2 at
214-216).
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business-related preemption cases as federalism cases.
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.251 involved an interesting application of
preemption and an interesting split of judicial opinion as to that application.
While it was a 5-4 decision, the Justices in the majority and in dissent reveal a
different make-up than the kind of 5-4 split which has characterized recent
federalism cases. 2 However, as Justice Stevens declares at the beginning of his
dissenting opinion, "This is a case about federalism.., that is, about respect for
the constitutional role of the states as sovereign entities. ' z3 But, as Stevens has
consistently argued in recent federalism cases, state sovereignty interests are
preserved in the Constitutional structure by their representation in the federal
legislature. His most recent statement on the issue appears in his dissent in Kimel
where he said:
The Framers did not, however, select the Judicial Branch as the constitutional
guardian of... state interests. Rather, the Framers designed important structural

safeguards... [within] the normal operation of the legislative process [that] itself
would adequately defend state interests from undue infringement... [Specifically],
it is the Framers' compromise giving each State equal representation in the Senate

that provides the principal structural protection for the sovereignty of the several
States.25
In the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Act)2 5 at issue in
Geier, Justice Stevens and his dissenting colleagues found that the states opted to
protect their sovereignty over tort actions. Stevens wrote that the states' attempt
to protect state remedies is reflected in the "cumulative force ' ,256 of several aspects
of the statute taken in conjunction with controlling precepts with regard to
preemption issues. First, the express preemption clause, § 1392(d) in the Act is
relatively narrow257 because it does not expressly exempt state common law tort
actions.~ Second, the savings clause, § 1397(k) "expressly preserves common law
claims" 59 hence, the state claims are not expressly preempted. Third, because
state law tort remedies are "within the scope of the states' historic police powers"
there is a presumption of no preemption unless it appears clearly the Congress
intended to pre-empt.m Fourth, in Geier, the safety standard at issue was

251. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000).
252. The voting configuration in Geier was: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia

and Kennedy joining Justice Breyer's opinion; and Justices Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg joining
Justice's Stevens dissent.
253. Id. at 1928 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
254. Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 651 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.
256. Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1934 (Justice Stevens dissenting).
257. See id. at 1933 (comparing § 1392(d) with other express preemption in statutes construed in
recent case law and deemed "broad" because they expressly pre-empt otherwise applicable state law).

258. See id. at 1934.
259. Id. at 1932.
260. Id. at 1932 (citing Justice Souter's dissent in Gade v. NationalSolid Waste Management, 505 U.S.
88, 116-117 (1992) ("If the [federal] statute's terms can be read sensibly not to have preemptive effect,
the presumption controls and no preemption can be inferred").
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expressly defined by the statute as a "minimum" standard 261 and under controlling
precepts of implied preemption, the states' common law stricter standards should
be preserved. And fifth, in this situation, the party arguing for implied
preemption bears "a special burden" to show either that the federal government
intended to occupy the field entirely or that "state law is in actual conflict with
federal law" so that either it would be impossible for a private party to comply
with both or the state law would frustrate the purpose and objectives of the
262
federal scheme.
Thus, for the dissent, the balance between states' sovereignty interests and
competing interests had been struck in the proper forum, the Congress, - in this
case - in favor of state tort claims which were not, according to the dissent,
preempted by the statute. But, the prevailing Justices, finding that Honda had
met "the special burden" of implied preemption, ruled that imposition of state tort
actions would indeed frustrate the purpose and objectives of the federal scheme.
That scheme was reflected in The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
promulgated by the Department of Transportation pursuant to the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act at issue. The standard, FMVSS 208 "required auto manufacturers to
equip some but not all of their 1987 vehicles with passive restraints [including
airbags]."2 63 The Court found that FMVSS 208 was consistent with the purpose
and objectives of the Act: it promoted safety while providing vehicle
manufacturers "with a range of choices among different passive restraint devices.
Those choices would bring about a mix of different devices introduced gradually
over time; ... thereby lower[ing] costs, overcom[ing] technical safety problems,
encourag[ing] technological development, and win[ning] widespread consumer
acceptance ....
264Geier's lawsuit, premised on state common law negligence, for
injuries she sustained in a Honda that did not have airbags or other passive
restraint devices, presented an obstacle to these purposes and objectives, said the
Court, because it would impose a duty on manufacturers to install airbags in all
cars (thereby posing an obstacle "to the gradual passive restraint phase") and
"could have made less likely the adoption of a state mandatory buckle-up law., 265
The immediate results of Geier include a victory for automobile
manufacturers and encouraging news for other business interests similarly
situated. In the long-view, the case offers some insights as to how the Court will
use the preemption doctrine to analyze state sovereignty issues. And, as the
business community saw in FloridaPrepaid, when it comes to federalism issues,
these cases can cut either way for business interests.
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin,266 was another preemption case in
261. See id. at 1929 (citing § 1392 (2)).
262. Geier, 120 S. Ct. at 1934.
263. Id. at 1916 (Justice Breyer, delivering the opinion of the Court).

264. Id. at 1921.
265. Id. at 1925. See also id. at 1919 (asserting the notion that a savings clause does not preclude
implied preemption under "ordinary preemption principles" and rejecting the notion that those
principles place a "special burden" on the party asserting implied preemption).

266. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 120 S. Ct. 1467 (2000).
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which the business interest (railway companies) prevailed. By an 8-2 margin, the
Court held that the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 267 in conjunction with the
Highway Safety Act of 1973, and regulations promulgated pursuant to its Highway
Crossing Program, 268 expressly preempted state common law claims. The case was
brought by decedent's estate. The estate claimed that warning signs at the
crossing where decedent was killed were insufficient to warn motorists of
oncoming trains.26 9 Because the warning signs were installed by federal funds,

pursuant to the statutes cited above, and because the regulation at issue had
mandatory effect, the federal law "covered the subject matter" and preempted
state tort actions. 270 Citing its previous holding in CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood
271and building on precepts developed there, the Court held that Norfolk So. RR,
presented a case where the federal regulations at issue "substantially subsume the
subject matter of the relevant state law' 272 because they apply to all warning
devices installed with the participation of federal funds. Easterwood established
that the preemption clause in the Federal Railroad Safety Act273 preempts state
law claims only where the federal regulation "covers" the subject-matter of the
state law and does not merely "touch upon" or "relate to" that subject-matter.274
Applying the rule to the facts in Easterwood,the Court found no preemption
when the regulation was couched in general terms and provided "a description...
,275 But where, as in Norfolk, the regulations "establish a
not a prescription ....
standard of adequacy," the276federal requirement is prescriptive, covers the subjectmatter and its preemptive.
Preemption also served business interests in United States v. Locke,277 where
the oil tanker industry was saved from the effects of Washington State's
regulations which imposed "best achievable protection ''278 (BAP) from oil spills
standards on the design and maintenance of oil tankers operating in state waters.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kennedy construed the Ports and
Waterway Safety Act 1972 (PWSA) 279 as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA)m finding that these statutes had a partial pre-emptive effect on
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

84 Stat. 971, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq.
87 Stat 283,23 U.S.C. § 130; 23 U.S.C. § 130; 23 C.F.R. § 646 214(b).
See Norfolk Southern. Ry. Co., 120 S. Ct. at 1471.
Id. at 1473.
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 120 S. Ct. at 1476.

273. The preemption clause reads in pertinent part:

Laws ....related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A
State may adopt or continue to enforce a law.., related to railroad safety until the

secretary... prescribes a regulation... covering the subject matter of the State requirement.
49 U.S.C. § 20106.
274. See Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 120 S. Ct. at 1473 (quoting Eastenvood,507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1475.

277. United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
27& Id. at 1142.
279. 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq as amended by the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978,42 Stat. 1471.
280. 104 Stat. 2375, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq (1994 ed. and Supp. III).
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Washington's maritime regulations. In so doing, Justice Kennedy clarified the
Court's holding in the applicable precedent of Ray v. Atlantic Richfield2 81 where
the Court addressed the issue of federal preemption of interstate navigation
regulation under the PWSA. The Ray Court held that PWSA reflected a
comprehensive federal and international regulatory scheme which pre-empted
Washington's tanker regulations with regard to pilotage, size, design and
construction.2
Justice Kennedy declared that the OPA did not change the
preemptive effect of PWSA; thus, Ray retained its precedential validity.2 While
the OPA did contain savings clauses, those clauses - found in Title I of the OPA had no relevance to Washington's tanker design and operations regulations - the
regulations which were at issue in Ray and in the instant case. To be sure, Title I's
savings clauses provide, in pertinent part that:
Nothing in this Act ... shall ... be construed.., as preempting the authority of any
State... from imposing any additional liability or requirements... with respect to the discharge of oil.. .[and]
Nothing in this Act... or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26
U.S.C. § 9509)] shall... be construed to affect the authority of the United States or
any State ... to impose
additional liability or... requirements ... relating to the
2 4
discharge of oil. S
But, these savings clauses are to be read in the context of Article I of the
OPA, an Article that deals exclusively with matters of assessing liability and other
financial requirements. "The evident purpose of the savings clause is to preserve
state laws which, rather than imposing substantive regulation of a vessel's primary
2
conduct, establish liability rules and financial requirements relating to oil spills." s
But insofar as the state regulations at issue in this case concerned the construction
and operation of oil-bearing vessels, they are covered by Title II of the OPA, a
Title which does not contain a savings clause. Thus, as a matter of traditional
statutory construction, in conjunction with relevant legislative history, a
Congressional Conference Report stating that the OPA "does not disturb the
Supreme Court's decision in Ray..." - the OPA did not disturb Ray's
interpretation of the preemptive effect of the PWSA. 286 In both Ray and in Locke
the state regulations with regard to construction and maintenance of oil tankers
were preempted.
Justice Kennedy also placed the relevant statutes in the larger context of
longstanding preemption doctrine. First, there is an assumption in Supremacy
Clause issues that "the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1145.
See id.
Id. at 1146.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1147.
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Congress." Second, the assumption "is not triggered when the State regulates in
an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence." Third,
"the federal interest [in maritime regulation] has been manifest since the
beginning of our Republic.. .."289 Fourth, therefore in the area of interstate
navigation, state concurrent regulatory authority is merely residual. 290 It is valid
only if it is shown to be consistent with a federal regulation that is not of
comprehensive and exclusive design ("purpose - conflict" or "conflict
preemption"). In Locke, the Court held that "conflict preemption" analysis was
applicable to OPA Title I issues).291 If, however, the federal regulatory scheme is
comprehensive and exclusive ("field preemption") which the Court held was
applicable to OPA Title 11 issues of vessel design and construction) 292 then even
state rules that parallel, supplement or duplicate federal rules are pre-empted.293
The case was remanded for consideration of the state regulatory scheme under the
foregoing analytical framework. 4
The final business-related preemption case this term was Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council,295 where a trade association representing companies

engaged in international commerce challenged a Massachusetts law precluding
state entities from doing business with any private company engaged in
commercial activities with Burma (now Mynamar). As in Locke and Norfolk, the
case presented the issue of the preemptive effect of federal law, in this case, the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act
(Act)296 and an Executive Order 297 promulgated pursuant to it. In pertinent part,
the Act banned non-humanitarian aid to and opposed international support for
Burma. It authorized the President to impose additional sanctions against Burma
and, most notably, to impose sanctions against "United States persons" engaging
in "new investments" in Burma. It also authorized the President to develop a
"comprehensive multilateral strategy to bring democracy to... Burma." And,
finally, the authorization included Presidential power "to waive.., any sanction
[under the federal Act] [in the] ... national security interests of the United

287. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

288. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1147 (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 1143 (citing the Federalist Nos. 44, 12, 64; Act of the First Congress in 1789 establishing
federal navigation certificates, See, Act of Sept 1. 1789, ch. 11 § 1, 1 Stat. 55; Cooley v. Board of
Warden of Port of Philadelphia ex rel. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996
(1852) (in some instances, state regulation of interstate navigation is precluded even where the federal
government has not entered the field); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824) (invalidating
state maritime law on preemption grounds); and Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How 227,16 L. Ed 243 (1859)
(federal maritime regulation was exclusive)).

290. See id. at 1148 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316,4 L. Ed. 579 (1819)).
291. Id at 1148-49.
292. See id. at 1149.
293. Id. at 1151. (citing, Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How 227,16 L. Ed 243 (1859)).

294. See Locke, 120 S.Ct. at 1152.
295. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
296. 110 Stat 3009-166.to 3009-167 (enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
§ 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172).
297. Burman Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 13047,3 CFR 202 (1997 Comp.).
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States
Crosby undisputedly implicated foreign policy issues, issues which have been
historically dominated by federal regulation, as were the maritime issues in Locke.
Hence, the assumption of no preemption absent statutory evidence of express
Congressional intent did not apply and - under the traditional preemption
framework, as outlined in Locke, the issue devolved either to "field preemption"
scrutiny or, if Congress did not evince an intent to occupy the issue
comprehensively and exclusively, then to "conflict preemption" (or "purposeconflict preemption") analysis.29 9 Noting, as did the Court in Locke,3 that
analysis under each rubric ("field" preemption and "conflict" or "purposeconflict" preemption) is not hermetically sealed,3 1 the Court concluded that the
Massachusetts law at issue here was pre-empted because it conflicted with the
Federal Act in at least three respects: delegation of discretionary powers to the
Executive to add or eliminate sanctions in the national interest; delegation to the
President of authority to develop a comprehensive scheme; and limitation of
commercial sanctions to "United States persons" engaged in "new investment" in
Burma. Thus, Massachusetts law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, '3° because it
curtails Presidential authorization by Congress "to achieve a political objective."
Therefore, the Massachusetts law was struck down on purpose-conflict
preemption grounds.
Crosby joins Locke and Norfolk So. RR and Geier in establishing the
analytical frame for current preemption theory.3 3 Taken together they form a
primer of modem preemption analysis. Crosby adds to the frame by making it
clear that even in a situation where, as there, federal law was enacted
after
34
conflicting state law, the Court will not require that preemption be express: 0
The State stresses that Congress was aware of the State Act in 1996, but did not
preempt it explicitly when it adopted its own Burma statute. The State would have
us conclude that Congress continuing failure to enact express preemption implies
approval, particularly in light of occasional instances of express preemption of state
sanctions in the past.... [T]he argument is unconvincing on more than one level. A
failure to provide for preemption expressly may reflect nothing more than the
settled character of implied preemption doctrine that courts will dependably apply,
and in any event, the existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause
does not30depend
on express congressional recognition that federal and state law may
5
conflict.

The other aspect that Crosby adds to our understanding of contemporary
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Crosby, 120 S.Ct. 2292 (citations omitted).
See supra notes 284-295 and accompanying text.
Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1149.
See Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.6.
Id. at 2294 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

304. Id.
305. Id. (citations and internal footnotes omitted).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000

33

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 6
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 36:153

preemption jurisprudence arises in the context of laws implicating international
commerce where the argument for uniformity may take on additional weight. In
this context, the Crosby Court clarified its opinion in Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.306 where the Court said that opinions of foreign
countries and of the Executive Branch were irrelevant in determining
Congressional intent on the issue of preemption. In Barclays, the evidence was
irrelevant because "Congress had taken specific actions rejecting the positions
both of foreign governments... and the Executive .... ,37
By contrast, in Crosby the Congress had expressly authorized the Executive
to use discretionary power to develop a multinational policy agenda on the issue
(what the Court calls a "plentitude of Executive authority" because it includes not
only Executive authority "plus all the Congress can delegate"). 03 And, the
Executive had made clear its sensitivity to the strenuous opposition of foreign
nations to the Massachusetts law.' 9 Similarly, the Court in Locke did not disdain
evidence of the concerns of foreign governments with regard to the Washington
tanker regulations. 3 0 Locke and, especially Crosby limit the evidentiary force of
Barclays and make it clear that in the international arena, particularly where
commerce questions trigger issues of foreign policy, the concern of foreign powers
will reinforce preemption arguments premised on the need for uniformity.
But, Crosby also leaves several questions unanswered. Among them are the
Court's silence on the issue of field preemption and its failure to address the lower
court's rulings on the foreign affairs power and the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause power.31' The Court acknowledged the omissions, stating simple that
because the case was resolved on purpose-conflict preemption grounds, the Court
did not need to reach those issues.312 A similar justification was proffered for its
failure to address the burgeoning issue of the presumption against preemption in
the context of international commerce and to sort out the complexity of judicial
approaches in that regard. On that issue, Crosby echoes Locke where the Court
began by assuming no preemption unless clearly manifest by Congress or by "a
history of significant federal presence," but explicitly declined to elucidate the
presumption issue in greater detail.313 These and other doctrinal ambiguities with
respect to preemption the Court, in its 1999 term, left for another day.
CONCLUSION

The 1999 term unmistakably signals the Court's proactive interest in
applying preemption analysis to federalism issues in the business context. And,
perhaps, that was the big news for business-related cases this term: the notable use
306. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. Of Cal., 512 U.S. 298,327-329 (1994).

307. Crosby, 120 S. Ct. at 2301 (citations omitted).
308. Id. at 2295. (citations and internal quotes omitted).
309. See id. at 2295-96.
310. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1149-50.

311. See generally, Crosby, 120 S.Ct. 2288.
312 See id.
313. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1147 (citations and internal quotes omitted).
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of preemption as an alternative battleground for litigating Supremacy Clause
versus state sovereignty issues which implicate commercial interests. In that
regard, the four preemption cases discussed above present an exegesis on
contemporary preemption doctrine that is certainly worthy of our attention. The
Court's special focus this term entailed the two species of implied preemption:
field preemption (Norfolk So RR Co. and - with regard to Title II of the OPA Locke) and purpose-conflict preemption (Geier, Cosby and - with regard to Title I
of the OPA - Locke). Each of these cases served the business interests well shielding them in every instance from more stringent state standards.
Obviously, it would be specious to conclude that this beneficent result will
always abide. To coopt Chief Justice Rehnquist's apt remarks in another context,
we can anticipate that in subsequent cases, business interests and their opposing
parties may find themselves changing positions "as nimbly as if dancing the
quadrille. 3 14 And it is certainly not out of the question to predict that business
interests and state sovereignty interests will occasionally coincide, or that - when
they conflict - state interests will prevail over business interests, as they did in
Florida Prepaidfor example. In that eventuality, business interests may need to
consider what recourse they have, what alternative strategies they might pursue.
As an illustration, proponents of the Massachusetts Burma Laws, following
Crosby, were left to pursue their unquestionably worthy objectives against
heinously repressive governments and the private companies which do business
with them,315 through extrajudicial means - including lobbying pension funds to
divest stock in those companies and lobbying Congress for non-preemptive
legislation.
In sum, resolution of the business-related preemption cases this term settles
relatively little and serves as harbinger for future legal disputes.

314. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NROC, 435 U.S. 519, 539-540 (1978) (discussing the
positions taken by the parties in the case with respect to the licensing procedure for nuclear reactors,
(then) Rehnquist opined, "[lit appears here, as in Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87, 73 S. Ct. 534,

537, 97 L. Ed. 842 (1953) that in this Court the parties changed positions as nimbly as if dancing a
quadrille").

See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1147 (citations and internal quotes omitted).
315. It is at least worthy of a footnote to identify some of the salient facts in Crosby. Unocal was the
putatively bad actor in the dispute, having had a significant and ongoing business relationship with the

repressive and corrupt Myanmar government. Unocal is, in fact, reputed to be the largest private
investor in Myanmar. Unocal is also a board member of the trade organization (the National Foreign
Trade Council), which initially sued Massachusetts. The Massachusetts case was dubbed by the trade

group to be a test case against state and local (what the group identifies under the subtly pejorative
label of "subfederal units,") legislative attempts to sanction doing business with repressive regimes.
The trade group especially Unocal, viewed the federal law as being relatively benign because it was
limited to sanctioning "new investments" thus, grand fathering in Unocal's prior dealings with
Myanmar including a recent and mammoth oil exploration and development project there. See, Janus
Resen, Trade Ruling is Victory for Oil Giant, NY TIMEs, June 20,2000, at A23 col 4.
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APPENDIX A
CASE CITATIONS
I.

Government Contracts
1.

HI.

II1.

Mobil Oil v. U.S., 2000 WL 807187 (2000)

Environment
2.

Friendsof the Earth,Inc., v. Laidlaw EnvironmentalServices, Inc., 120
S.Ct. 693 (2000)

3.

PublicLands Councilv. Babbitt,120 S. Ct. 1815 (2000).

4.

Vermont Agency of NaturalResources, 120 S. Ct. 1858 (2000)

Taxation
5.

Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. FranchiseTax Board of California,120 S. Ct. 1022
(2000)

6.

Baral v. U.S., 120 S. Ct. 1006 (2000).

IV. Bankruptcy
7. Hartford UnderwritersIns. Co. v. Union PlantersBank, 120 S. Ct. 1942
(2000)
8. Raleigh v. IllinoisDept. of Revenue, 120 S. Ct. 1951 (2000)
V.

Patent/Trademark

9.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. SamaraBros. Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000)

VI. Civil Procedure
10.

Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1579 (2000)

11.

Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000)
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VII. Civil RICO
12. Beck v. Prupis,120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000)
13. Ratello v. Wood, 120 S. Ct. 1075 (2000)
14.

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000)

15. Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Slater, 120 S. Ct. 722 (2000)
16.

Cortez Byrd Chips,. Inc. v. Bill HarbertConstruction Co., 120 S. Ct.
1331 (2000)

17. Fischerv. U.S., 120 S. Ct. 1780 (2000)
18.

Pegramv. Hedich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000)

19. HarrisTrust and Savings Bank v. Salomom Smith Barney, Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 2180 (2000)
20.

Christensenv. HarrisCounty, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000)

21.

Reeves v. SandersonPlumbing Products,Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000)

VIII.Federalism
22. Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000)
23.

Crosby v. NationalForeignTrade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000)

24. Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, 120 S. Ct. 1913 (2000)
25.

Norfolk Southern RR Co. v. Shanklin, 120 S. Ct. 1467 (2000)

26.

U.S. v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000)
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